Analyst’s Certification
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BMO POLICY FOR
MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CONNECTION WITH INVESTMENT RESEARCH
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Background
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This policy is
issued pursuant to, and reflects compliance with, the FSA's
Conduct of Business Rules and applies to research disseminated from the United Kingdom.
It does not create third party rights or duties that would not already exist
if the policy had not been publicly available, and it does not form part of
any contract between BMO Capital Markets (or any of its affiliates) (‘BMO’)
and any client or prospective client.
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2 -
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This policy is an
adjunct to BMO’s overarching general FSA obligation to act with integrity and
fairness, both with its clients and with its counterparties.
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Application
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This policy applies to investment
research that is held out as objective in nature, that is, research that
provides an impartial assessment of the value or prospects of its subject
matter — or research that would reasonably be seen by those for whom it is
intended as providing such an impartial assessment.
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How BMO identifies conflicts
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BMO, pursuant to
its general obligation to act with integrity and fairness, has implemented
policies to identify and deal with conflicts that occur from time to time as
a result of the publication of research. BMO manages those conflicts of which
it is aware, and monitors the effectiveness of its policies and procedures.
The following are
some of the ways BMO identifies and manages conflicts between its research
product and other parts of BMO:
Internal guidance
and training. BMO provides training to relevant employees to raise
their awareness and sensitivity, as well as their knowledge of how to deal
with conflicts when they arise.
Control room. BMO makes use of
a control room to centralize information about its activities and thereby
monitor for potential conflicts that may arise in an investment bank.
Editorial
guidelines and procedures. BMO provides for review of research
material by supervisory analysts prior to its publication.
Internal
arrangements. BMO employs a number of internal procedures to regulate
the flow of information between and within business areas, including research.
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How BMO supervises and manages
investment analysts
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In general, a
person whose function might reasonably be expected to conflict with the
interests of people who receive a firm's research should not be responsible
for (a) supervising analysts from day to day; (b) deciding questions of which
investments receive coverage, the timing of the publication of that coverage
or its content; or (c) the analyst's remuneration. In particular, these
issues result in the following policies.
Management. BMO policy is
that analysts who publish research are directly supervised by, and report
directly to, research management. (Note that this policy does not prevent
research management, on one hand, and investment banking or sales and trading
management, on the other, from reporting to the same person at a more senior
level.)
Editors. Editorial control
is exclusive to analysts, supervisory analysts and editors.
Coverage
decisions. The decision of which investments are to receive research
coverage; the timing of such coverage; and the content of such coverage
belong solely to research management. (Research management may take account
of input from other business areas.)
Research during
offerings — timing. The timing of research issued during offerings will
be dictated by a variety of factors relating to the transaction, including
advice from deal counsel. In addition, BMO may impose a "quiet
period" and/or research distribution restrictions prior to the
commencement of marketing of the transaction. Such research is not usually
permitted in the context of US and Canadian offerings.
Personal account
dealing As a general rule, BMO does not permit an analyst to deal
in the securities of issuers covered by his or her research, and generally
does not allow the analyst to deal in a way opposite to their published
recommendation.
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How BMO pays investment analysts
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Consistent with
the need to ensure independence of analysts from other business areas, BMO
structures the remuneration of its analysts so that it does not create (or
appear to create) incentives that would be inconsistent with their
impartiality.
Linkage. Analyst
remuneration may not be linked to specific transactions; or to the content or
recommendation of a specific research report. Analyst remuneration may,
however, be linked to the overall performance of BMO or to an aggregated
result which includes other activities, including the results of investment
banking transactions
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Timing and manner of publication
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Advance knowledge. BMO’s policy is
that no employees (other than appropriate Research and Compliance employees)
may learn of the timing or content of research before it is appropriately
distributed.
Simultaneous
distribution. BMO makes its research available simultaneously to clients
and other parts of BMO (including proprietary traders). It does not impose a
waiting period between publication and the time when trading and proprietary
desks can act on the research.
Restrictions on
distribution. Occasionally, BMO may restrict the distribution of
research for legal, contractual or regulatory reasons as, for example, where
BMO is involved in an underwriting or another significant transaction or
marketing effort where investment banking services are being provided. The
nature and type of such restrictions will depend on the type of transaction
and upon the individual circumstances of the transaction. In some cases, no
restriction on the distribution of research will be imposed.
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Disclosure of interests
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BMO makes every
effort to disclose the interests both of itself and its employees in the
subject matter of a research report. Typically, interests regarded as disclosable include the following.
Interests. Material interests
of BMO or its affiliates in the securities of companies referred to in
research.
Directorships. Directorships and
other material relationships of individual officers of BMO or its affiliates.
Trading. Market making
undertaken by BMO in the relevant investments.
Mandates. Investment
banking mandates (provided this would not entail the disclosure of any
confidential commercial information) or relationships and personal interests
of an analyst or household member of an analyst.
Personal account
dealings. Personal account transactions or holdings by an analyst in
the investments covered by their research.
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Other Control Procedures
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On the condition
that such activities do not impinge on an analyst's impartiality, or on the
appearance of that objectivity, BMO under certain conditions permits its
analysts to engage in activities in addition to the production of research.
Inducements. BMO has a policy
relating to the receiving and giving of gifts and inducements which is
designed to ensure that employees of BMO may never use their positions within
BMO for personal, private or business gain for themselves, their families or
friends, BMO itself or other persons.
Dealing ahead. BMO policy does
not permit its employees, either on behalf of themselves, clients or BMO, to
deal ahead of the publication of research. Note that this does not prevent an
analyst from speaking to sales people and traders; or traders from conducting
market-making activity.
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